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Make .. Believe, and its Role in Pictorial 
Representation and the Acquisition of Knowledge1 
Kendall L. Walton 
Make,believe is not just for children. Many adult activities are best 
understood as continuations of children's make,believe, and can be 
illuminated by comparing them with games of dolls, cops and robbers, and 
hobby horses. One adult activity that involves make,believe is that of 
making and looking at pictures. What are pictures? How do pictures of a 
man differ from the word 'man'? In a nutshellt pictures are props in visual 
games of make,believe.1 
In "Meditations on a Hobby Horse, 11 Ernst Gombrich compared pictures 
to a simple hobby horse, a stick-perhaps with a wooden "head" attached, 
but perhaps just a plain stick-on which a child "rides" around the house. 
Gombrich considered and rejected describing this stick as an 'image of a 
horse,' an "imitation of [a horse's] external form." He also considered and 
rejected thinking of it as a sign that signifies or stands for or refers to a 
horse, or to the concept horse. Pictures also, he suggested, are noc to be 
thought of in either of these ways. He proposed thinking of pictures and 
hobby horses, rather, as substitutes. A hobby horse substituces for a horse; a 
picture of a man substitutes for a man.J 
"Meditations on a Hobby Horse," famous though it is, has been largely 
ignored . It is fair to say that mosc discussions of pictorial representation 
during the last forty years have proceeded in one or the other of the two 
directions Gombrich advised against. There are resemblance theories of 
representation (some more sophisticated than others). And there are 
semiotic theories, such as that of Nelson Goodman, who declares flatly 
that "denotation is the core of representation."4 Even Gombrich's own 
later work, including Art and Illusion, has been understood by some to 
advance the idea that pictures are imitations of the external forms of 
objects. Others find in it the conception of pictures as symbols or signs that 
signify or stand for what they are pictures of.5 Neither interpretation is 
entirely without justice. But Gombrich's original characterization of 
pictures as substitutes, and his comparison of pictures with hobby horses, was 
on the right track. 
Two central thoughts stand out in Gombrich's reflections on pictures 
and the hobby horse. First, he emphasizes that "art is 'creation' rather than 
'imitation'." "The child 'makes' a train either of a few blocks or with pencil 
on paper," he observes - she doesn't imitate or refer to a train; she makes 
one. 6 "All art is 'image, making' and all image,making is rooted in the 
creation of substitutes. "7 But is it mere substitutes that the image maker 
creates? Gombrich described the child as making a train out of blocks or on 
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paper, not a substitute for a train. To cement the uncenainry he states: 
"By its c�pacicy to serve as a 'sub tirute' the stick becomes a hor e in iL 
own right, it belongs in the class of 'gee gees' and may even merit a proper 
name of its own." What is it chat the artist creates when she draws a man, 
a man or a substitute for a man? 
The second central idea that Gombrich derives from the association of 
pictures with hobby horses is an emphasis on function rather than form. 
"The 'firsc' hobby horse was . . .  just a stick which qualified as a horse 
because one could ride on it." "Any ridable object could serve as a horse." 
A balJ represents a mouse to a cat, he says. And to a baby, who sucks its 
thumb as if it were a breast, the thumb represents a breast. "The ball has 
nothing in common with the mouse except that it is chasable. The thumb 
nothing with the breast except that it is suckable. "9 Function rather than 
form. 
But the distinction between function and form may seem co be just 
where hobby horses and pictures diverge. Yes, a mere stick with hardly any 
of the form of a horse, just enough to be "ridable," serves as a horse. But 
pictures capture the appeaTance of the things they picture. One doesn'c ride 
a picture of a horse; one looks at it. But a single object can have more than 
one function. One function of a horse is to be ridden, but another func, 
tion, which some horses have for some people, is to be looked at. Maybe 
pictures of horses substitute for horses as objects of seeing. 
Much of what Gombrich said in spelling out the analogy between hobby 
horses and pictures is blatently and straightforwardly false. (Maybe this is 
one reason why his early essay was ignored.) The notion that the stick is 
(literally) a horse, or that a picture of a man is {literally) a man, is as 
blatant a falsehood as one can find. The stick is a stick and the picture is a 
picture. Nevertheless, as Gombrich observes, it is perfectly ordinary for 
perfectly sane people to point to a picture of a man and say, in all serious, 
ness, "That is a man." It is also perfectly natural for a perfectly normal child 
to point to the stick and say, "This is a horse." 
Are these just short ways of saying, "That is a substitute man" or "This is 
a substitute horse," it being understood that substitutes are not the real 
thing? But the hobby horse is not much of a substitute for a horse. Had 
Paul Revere's horse been sick the night of the British attack, he could 
hardly have made do with a hobby horse borrowed from a neighborhood 
child. Not even a wonderfully realistic hobby horse with a carved head and 
carpet tacks for eyes would have enabled him to beat the British to 
Concord. Hobby horses are not ridable, not really; so they can't really 
substitute for actual horses. And if someone wants to look at a horse, a 
picture of a horse is not a very satisfactory replacement. To see a picture of 
a horse is not to see a horse, not really. And the viewer of the picture does 
not even enjoy an illusion of seeing a horse. In all but the rarest of cases it 
is perfectly obvious that what one is seeing is a flat surface with marks on 
it, not a horse. 3
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h�urc I 
Jonathan E."l,tman 
John.,on 
� Old tag�\."Oelch. 
1 .. i l 
Oil on an' ;cu. 
36 1 4" ;\ 60 l .. 
Lavton Art ""'�11lecrion. 
The Milwaukt.'C Art 
Mw.cum 
The chilJrcn in Jonarh,rn Ea rm,rn J1.)hn�on's The Old Sw,gl'co<11.:h (ftgurl' 
I) ha\'C omerhing better rhan ·ticb co use f1.x hor es; some nl t henn rlar 
che part· rhem el\'c _ Bu l chi!Jren are not really hnr!-.CS any m<xc chan 
·rick are. They arc nor much hencr than sticb for riding-Paul Rie\'crc 
coulJn't ha,·e replaceJ hi �ick hor .. e with .. 1 neighbor·� child .my IHllrl' 
·uccc fully chan wirh the child ' hobb,· hor..,c. And c\·en four chilJren 
can't pull a .  ragecoach very far. or really. 
Bur the children in thi piccure h8\'C created ,1 fic1i01wl world-the world 
of their game of make,hclie\'e. W'i1hin c/1is vt•orld there arc horses-real 
one , not ·ub·titute ; and they really do pull the stagecoach. Lcr' :.;1y th,u 
it i ficiionnl, fic tional in the world of the game ni make,helic\'l', dMt real 
hor e· arc really pulling chc srngccoach. �peaking in the real wnrld, I mu t 
say that the hor·e� are merely rcal,jn,the,world,of,thc,gamc, that it  i only 
fic tional rha1t they are real. Bur if I coulJ get in ·iJe the fic tional world 
myself and peak rhere, I could ay that rhc hor·c are real, />eriod. 
The children you ec are in the fictional world. It i fic tional, rruc,in, 
che,,vorld-of,thc,game, trhac omc of them arc riJing in a crnKh puHcJ by 
real hor es. And they can ay, within the game, "Tho e are real hor cs" (if 
chey feel it  necessary co belabor the obviou ) . It is only when we ·rnnd 
outside the game, when parents arc talking about the frun their children arc 
having with rhe old broken down rnge coach, for in ranee, thac aying 
"That is a hor e" i · a blatant fol chooc.I. Yes, Paul Revere can not replace 
an ailing real hor·e with either a hobby hor e or a child. But that i 
becau e the British attack come in the real world. If  the Briri h attacked 
in the world of make,believe, a chil<l might ride off on hi hobby hor ·e or 
on another child-on what in the world of the game i · a real hor e-to 
spread the alarm. 
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r._ :e -
Clark n unfidd 
On the Dogge-r Bank, 1 6 
01  on Cama;, 
30 '( 27 1 2 
B\ c.oun�\ of the Board of T rus lee<> 
of chc \"ictoria and Albert �foseum 
Pictures have world al o. There is a "hip tn rhe worlJ of rnnfielJ' On the 
Dagger Bank (figure 2)-a real htp, not a ub riruce. From my po i t  ion 
here m rhe real world I haH! to cell you that chi 1 n'c real!� a real hip; 
here in the real \vorl<l we have nmhmg burc a picture con i ung of ltghc 
projected cm a screen, a picture of a hip; i t  i merely fictional char there i 
a real !">htp here. Bur 1f I could omehow get in ·ide the pic[Ure, in ide the 
picture world, l could then say, "Thar i a real ship." 
Gombnch' analogy ben.veen picture and hobby hor e now cem in 
jeopar<ly. A child playing with a hobby hor e belong ro che world of her 
game of make�believc. But the 5pccrntor of a picture doe not belong to 
rhe world of the picture. Real people can and <lo get inside make,believc 
worlds. But all we can do with piccure worlds, it  seems. i ob erve chem 
from outside. 
Bue wait! How did the hip gee into Srnnficld' · picture? Maybe I can gee 
in in the same way. (Figure 3.) 
Figure 3: 
Doctored version of On the Dogger Bank 
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\ifake-Bcliet•e. and its Role in P1cwrial Repusenumon ) 
I brought my son along to help me paddle. It really i me in the picture 
world. It is fictional. "true in the world of the picture" chat L Kendall 
Walton. am paddling a canoe in hea\")' seas close to a small �ailing ship. I 
got into the picture world in almost the same way the ship did. It was 
painted in; I was pasted in, and that is just as good.1'' \Xlhile I am in the 
picture world I can with perfect appropriatenes. declare the ship to be real. 
But this is disappointing, and not ju t because I ruined a nice picture. I 
am not present in the picture world in the way a child playing hobby horses 
is present in the wild west world of her game of make-believe. The trouble 
is that I am still here in the real world. giving a lecture in Brockport, New 
York. And I am looking not ar a ship. but just at a picrure, a picture of 
myself looking at a ship. The difference in the two ways of being in 
fictional worlds is parrly this: What is in the picture world depends on the 
picture, on a pattern of shapes and colors on a flat surface. But what exists 
in a game of rnake�believe depends on the children who are playing the 
game, as well as on properties of the stick and other props. I t  is because of 
the pattern of light on the screen (or colors on the flat surface), because of 
the extra shapes caused by doctoring the picture, that my son and I are 
paddling a canoe in the picture world; where I (really) am and what I am 
actually doing now is irrelevant. But it is because of what the child is 
actually doing, because she is straddling the stick and jumping around the 
ho.use, that she belongs to the world of her game and, in that world, rides a 
horse. 
Maybe instead of trying to squeeze myself into a picture, I can make the 
picture world bigger, big enough to include me where I am. It will have to 
expand in the third dimension, like this: 
Figure 4: 
Drawings by 
F.B. Modell; 
© 195 1 ,  1979 
The New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc. 
This gentleman is not in the picture world proper, inside the frame, but 
there is a larger world extending in front of the picture that includes both 
him and the saguaro cacti in the picture. He has the right kind of presence 
in this world: it is by virtue of his actually standing in front of the painting 
that it is fictional in the expansion of the picture world that the desert sun 
casts a shadow behind him. 
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Thi mif:!hc .. eem fanca-.nc. howt:\'t:!L h:\ md the capactf\' of real worlJ 
mortal . Milic pamce<l un' arcn 'r 1'nll1anr enough re ca_r acrucll '>hadO\\ ... 
into the real world. But cht idea v. a noc to make ficnonal rhmg real: our 
thought wa"i ro gee rht actual ... peccamr mco a ficnonal worlJ. to expand 
the p1ccurc world arounJ the '.)pcccaror. Cara\·af!gio\ Bacchus (figure 5) i a 
real life picture whose world really doe. expand ro mdudc \'OU and me. 
h�un: 5 
Car.n·aggio 
Bacchus, c. 1 59 5  
Oil on Camel 
37 3 " x  33 I '2" 
Uffui, Florence 
Bacchus offers you a drink. You may not be able to take the glass of wine 
from his hand, but even before you do he ha you in a fictional world-not 
the world of the painting proper, but a larger world that include both you 
and what i in the picture. It is fictional in this larger world that Bacchus 
offers you a glass of wine. And what makes this fictional is the fact that you 
arc actually here in this auditorium looking at the image on the screen. By 
placing yourself in front of the picture you put yourself in position to be the 
recipient of Bacchus' offer. 
Think of this larger world as the world of a game of make,believe in 
which the picture is a prop. There is a parallel with the child's hobby 
horse. When the hobby horse leans unused in the comer of a room, we can 
think of it as, by itself, establishing a fictional world something lLke the 
world of a picture (or a sculpture). There is a real horse in that world, but 
a child playing checkers on the other side of the room does not belong to 
it. When the child takes the stick and uses it as a prop in a game, the 
world of the hobby horse expands into a world of a game of make,believe, 
and in this world the child rides the horse. The larger world is established by 
the prop, the stick, together with what the child does with it. 
Normally spectators don't do anything with pictures as physical as 
riding them; museums have rules about not touching paintings. But we do 
look at pictures, and looking at Caravaggio's Bacchus in the normal 
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manner lets one in for an offer of a drink-in the world of rhe game of 
make,believe. (We are sometimes tempted co play more physical games 
with pictures, however. A portrait of a despised politician makes a wonder, 
ful prop in a game in which we, fictionally, throw darts at him.) 
Bacchus is a special case. Looking ac most picture does not make it 
fictional that one is offered a drink. But it is fictional not only that 
Bacchus offers you a drink, but also that you see him. And depending on 
the manner in which you examine the picture, it may be fictional thac you 
look into his eyes, or that you avert your gaze; that you identify and count 
the fruit in front of him, or that you fail to notice the fruit-all this in the 
world of the game with the picture. 
In looking at Stanfield's seascape we expand the picture world, which 
itself contains a ship floundering in the sea, into a larger world of make, 
believe in which we see th� ship. We use the picture as a prop in a game in 
which it is fictional, by virtue of our actually looking at it in the way we do, 
that we see a ship. It may be fictional also that we examine the rigging, or 
watch the sailor in the seem trying co retrieve the broken spar from the 
sea, or focus on the wave in the background that is about to lift the ship's 
bow high in the air. 
So I can, after all, while standing here in this auditorium, say "See that 
ship? It's a real one!"- provided chat in saying this I am participating in 
the game of make,believe. speaking within the world of my game. Jusc as 
st�addling a stick and jumping around establishes a fictional world in 
which one rides a horse, looking at a picture establishes a fictional world in 
which one observes things of the kind the picture depicts. 
We now have a better way of understanding what it means to call the 
stick or a picture a substitute. The stick is neither a real horse nor can it 
really be used as a horse; one can't ride it. But it can be used in a game of 
make,believe within which it is real and is really ridable. The picture is 
used in games in which it is fictional that one really sees a real ship. 
Games of make,believe are imaginative activities. As they climb on and 
in and around the old stage coach, the children do not merely observe that 
it is fictional that the stage is moving at high speed, drawn by four horses, 
that Rodney (lee's call him that} is handling the reins, and so forth. They also 
imagine all this to be true. 
A mere spectator of the game could imagine chis as well, of course. So 
what is the advantage of participating in the game? In part, it is the fact that 
participants imagine about themselves. Rodney imagines that he, Rodney, is 
driving a stage. But this is not all. He also imagines riding driving a stage. 
Imagining doing something or experiencing something is not the same as 
imagining that one is doing or experiencing it. Remember the canoe 
expedition my son and I took into the Stanfield painting .. As I looked at 
the doctored picture noting within its frame the photographic image taken 
on a canoe trip on the Mississagi River, I imagined that I ,  Kendall Walton, 
was paddling a canoe with my son in dangerously heavy seas near a 
8
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bartered sailing hip. But I did nor imagine paddling a canoe in dangerou ly 
heavy seas. Whac I imagined doing was wcuchmg myself paddle a canoe in 
heavy seas. This is the main reason why my excursion inco che piccure 
world was disappointing, why my presence there was less arisfying chan 
the presence of children in their games of make,believe. The child playing 
with his hobby horse doe not imagine merely char he is riding a horse, he 
imagines riding one. 
Besides che overt physical participation I have considered o far, 
children participate verbally and psychologically in games of make,believe. 
Rodney "shouts directions to the horses": He really does shouc-he does 
make loud vocal noises and in doing so he makes ic fictional char he shouts 
to the horses. He imagines shouting to che horses, and he imagines of che 
noises he actually emits that they are his shoucs to che horses. 
Psychological participation is especially important. l e  is fic tional that 
Rodney is thrilled and a little nervous, as he strains co control the team, 
and maybe it is fictional that he swells with pride at the momentous 
responsibility entrusted to him of taking the stage safely to its destination. 
He really is tense and excited. And it is in virtue of this that fictionally he 
is tense and excited. He is not really proud of his responsibility for the 
stage; he realizes perfecdy well that he doesn't actually have that responsi, 
bility, that he is only playing a game. But he does really experience a 
swelling sensation, as he imagines bearing this responsibility. It is partly this 
sensation that makes it fictional that he swells with pride in the impor, 
tance of his position. Aware of his swelling sensations, he spontaneously 
imagines them to be swellings of pride in his responsibility for the safety of 
the journey. 
Where does the swelling sensation come from? What causes Rodney's 
feelings of tension and excitement? These actual feelings result from his 
imaginings, from his imagining, vividly, driving the stage, looking out for 
bandits, bearing the responsibility for the safety of the stage and its 
passengers. There is a complex interplay between Rodney's actual feelings 
or sensations and his imaginings; they interact with and feed each other. 
His vivid imagining of his momentous responsibility stimulates actual 
swelling sensations, which he imagines to be feelings of pride in his 
responsibilities. 
Spectators of paintings participate psychologically, as well as visually 
and verbally, in games of ma.ke,believe in which the pictures are props. 
I feel tension as I notice the enormous waves in Stanfield's seascape and 
the ship's disarray, and I "interpret" this tension as a combination of fear 
for the safety of the ship and awe at the power of the sea. I really do feel a 
certain tension, as I look at the picture. I don't really fear for the ship, since 
I know that what is before me is not a ship but a painting. But it is fictional 
in my game that I see a real ship and see the difficulty it is having in high 
seas. I imagine seeing this, and I imagine fearing for the ship's safety. My 
actual feelings of tension are incorporated into my imaginative experience: 
9
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I imagme these actual feelings to be feelings of a combination of fear for 
the ship and awe at the power of nat\.lre. 
Compare a dream in which you are on your way co school, and the 
school bell rings while you are still two blocks away. This means a tardy 
slip and half an hour of detention at the end of the day. On waking from 
the dream, you realize that the scho l bell was really the :sound of your 
alarm clock, and that you still have an hour before classes begin. The 
sound of the alarm was actual and you really did hear it \vhile you were 
dreaming, bur you "interpreted" it in your dr1eam as the school bell. You 
imagined hearing the school bell, and you imagined what actually was the 
hearing of the alarm to be your hearing of the school bell. 
Pictures, as I said, are props in visual games of make-believe. A picture 
of a turtle is a prop in games in which it is fictional that viewers see a 
turtle, and in which they imagine seeing a turtle, and imagine their actual 
visual experience of the picture to be their seeing of a turtle. 
Most accounts of pictorial representation realize only the world of the 
picture, and have the viewer standing outside that world and observing it. 
Theories differ as to the manner in which a picture picks out the proposi­
tions constituting its world. Some say it does so by virtue of resemblance or 
similarity; the picture resembles states of affairs of the kind the proposi­
tions it picks out express-a picture of a turtle resembles or looks like a 
turtle (the state of affairs of there being a turtle). Others say conventions 
of some sort are involved. (These correspond roughly to Gombrich's two 
rejected alternatives.) In either case, the viewer's job is to ascertain what 
propositions the picture picks out, what is "true in the world of the 
picture," by noting the relevant resemblances or by adducing the relevant 
conventions. 
Here is an example to demonstrate the inadequacy of understanding 
picture perception as merely a matter of ascertaining what is "true in the 
picture." Consider two films of a roller coaster ride. Both were made by a 
camera attached to the last car of the roller coaster. In one case, the 
camera is hung from a support in such a way that it remains aligned with 
the horizon even when the car rolls from side to side. In the other case the 
camera is attached rigidly to the roller coaster so as to tip back and forth as 
the car does. [n the first film, the horizon remains horizontal on the screen, 
and one sees the roller coaster sway to the right and the left. In the second 
film, the image of the roller coaster remains upright on the screen, while 
the horizon tilts. Let's add that both films have circular rather than 
rectangular images on the screen. The two films contain exactly the same 
information; the world of the picture is the same in both cases. In fact, we 
could make a showing of one indistinguishable from the other just by 
rotating the image at the appropriate times. 
But the viewees experiences of the two films will be very different. The 
viewer of the one made by the rigidly attached camera has the impression 
of riding in the roller coaster, of swaying dangerously right and left as the 
10
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roller coaster goes around turn . The \'1ewer of che orher film ha� che 
impression of watchmg che waymg roller coascer from a �table po inon 
ourside of ic. The v1�wtr of che former i more likelv chan the \'!ewer of rhe 
latter to fee] sick. The difference hes in the pecramr ' game of make­
believe and their expenences of 1maginmg seeing. The pecramr of one 
film imagines seeing the roller coaster from a per pective fixed relarive co 
the careening roller coaster. The peccacor of the other film imagine 
seemg che same roller coaster careening in the ame manner, but from a 
perspective fixed relative to the earth and detached from the roller coa ter. 
Words are nm picrnre . And the difference i much more fundamental 
than is suggested by saying merely that word and picture are ymbol of 
different kinds. Words do not e entially have anything to do with make­
bel ieve at all. If you tell me chat San Antonio i the site of the battle of the 
Alamo, you are just conveying to me a piece of information. Your word do 
not call for :imagining on my part at all like the imagining a child engage 
in when she "rides" a hobby hor e, or the imaginings of pectators when 
they look at pictures. 
When language is used fictionally, however, in novels and stories and 
cheater, for instance, it is used as a prop in games of make,believe. Specta­
tors at a performance of Romeo and Juliet, I ike those portrayed in figure 6, 
engage in make,believe in which they, fictionally, not only watch Juliet 
and Romeo but also listen to their words. The spectators' actual tears are 
not actually tears of grief for the characters, since the spectators fully 
realize that there is nobody really to grieve for. But they "interpret"' their 
tears, in the game, as tears of grief; they imaginatively grieve for Romeo 
and Juliet and imagine their actual rears to be tears of grief. 
Figure 6: 
Thomas Rowlaindson 
Tragedy Spectators 
(1 789) 
Where did the tears come from in the first place? They result from the 
spectators' vivid imaginings of the tragedy and of the sufferings endured by 
Romeo and Juliet. The vivacity of the imaginings depends to a consider, 
11
Walton: Make-Believe and Its Role in Pictorial Representation
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1992
Make-Belie�:e. and its Role in Picwrial Representation 91 
able extent on the skill \\ith which the actors portray the rraged-, of 
course. A bad performance will fail to elicit \'ivid imaginings and actual 
tears that can be imagined to be tears of grief. 
Novels and stories are not usually props in visual games of make-believe. 
But we do use them in games that have psychological dimensions. The 
reader of Anna Karenina does not merely note that it is fictional that Anna 
is unfaithful to her husband, suffers the disappro\'al of society, and is finally 
driven to throw herself under the wheels of a train. It is fictional in the 
reader's game that he learns about all this, that he sympathizes with Anna, 
and suffers with her. He imagines learning about an actual Anna, and 
imagines sympathizing and grieving for her. 
The words of many novels and stories are "substitutes" not for people 
and events of the kinds they describe, bur for serious repons about such 
events. We use the text of Gulliver's Travels in a game in which it is 
fictional that it is the text of the journal of a ship's physician, a certain 
Lemuel Gulliver. We imagine, of our actual reading of the novel, that it is 
a reading of such a journaE, and we imagine learning from it about 
Gulliver's adventures in various exotic lands. 
What is the point of all this make-believe ? le consists largely in the 
imaginings props elicit in participants, in their imagining seeing, or reading 
about, or learning about, or knowing about, events of this or that sort, and 
imagining feeling one way or another about them. The value of these 
imaginings is iln part cognitive. We gain understanding about the real 
world by engaging in them. 
There are plenty of ordinary instances in which imagining assists us 
cognitively. In many of them it is crucial that one imagines doing or 
experiencing certain things; imagining merely that certain states of affairs 
obtain or that certain events transpire doesn't do the job. This suggests 
that the cognitive value of representational works of art depends heavily 
on their prompting appreciators to imagine seeing, or reading about, or 
learning about, or knowing about, events of this or that sort, and to 
imagine feeling one way or another about them. Merely recognizing the 
world of the work and imagining it to be actual doesn't suffice. 
(a) How will your study look if the walls are painted the color of this 
paint chip? In order to decide, you imagine the walls being that color, but 
you also imagine seeing them when they are that color. How does it then 
look, in your imagination? If you are better at imagining colors than l am, 
you will have learned how your study would look, in reality, if it is painted 
that color. 
(b) If you have two right hand gloves whose mates are lost, can you 
make a right into a left by turning it inside out? Try it in imagination. 
Imagine peeling the glove off your right hand so that it turns inside out, 
and then fitting it onto your left hand. Yes, it fits! It is crucial to the 
success of this experiment that one imagine seeing the glove turned inside 
orut and then fitting onto your left hand. Just imagining that it has been 
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turned inside out doesn't do the trick. 
(c) If you face a difficult decision and can 'c make up your mind, cry 
flipping a coin. Shall I take a JOb with a rodeo, or work in an accounting 
firm? Which do I prefer? The coin itself doesn't know my mind. Bue 
suppose that it tells me to go with the rodeo. I may then find my elf 
dismayed at the outcome. Alternatively, I may be relieved ae having 
escaped the accounting firm and glad thae my way is now clear to join the 
r1odeo. Now, l know my mind. And I do what I now know I wane to do, 
regardless of what the coin toss decreed. 
This technique has a serious drawback. I can'e use ie deliberately, 
knowingly. If I plan from the start co do what I want to do, in the end, and 
use the coin just to figure out what I want, the coin won't do its job. I 
won't feel dismayed or relieved at the result of the coin toss, since I have 
already decided not to be bound by the result anyway. So I won't learn 
from the coin toss what it is that I want. I have to deceive myself, to really 
think, somehow, that I will do what the coin tells me to, in order to find 
out what I really want. Only then can I change my mind and follow my 
newly uncovered preference, rather than the coin. 
Imagination to the rescue. Rather than using the coin, I imagine 
deciding one way or the other. I then notice whether, in my imagination, I 
am relieved or disappointed. This reaction tells me what I really want to do, 
and that is what I do. 
(d) What is it like to live a life of abject poverty, or to be discriminated 
against, or to be suddenly bereaved, or to be· condemned to die, or to suffer 
neurotic paranoia, or to be intensely lonely? I imagine myself having these 
experiences, and this helps me to understand what it is like to have them. 
When children engage in make,believe they learn from their imagina, 
tive experiences in ways like those I have illustrated. So do adults, when 
they appreciate representational works of art. 
I might learn how I would feel, were I to suffer bereavement, by imagin, 
ing the loss of a loved one. But I might get it wrong. If I should later suffer 
such a loss in real life, it might turn out that my experience is not at all like 
what I imagined it would be. (I already know not to trust my imagination 
in ascertaining how a room will look if it is painted a certain color.) 
But I may learn something important by imagining being bereaved ,  even 
if I don't learn what it would be like for me actually to be bereaved. I may 
learn what a certain possible experience is like; I may come to understand 
what it would be like to experience in a certain way the loss of a loved one, 
even if I have no idea whether or in what circumstances I would experi, 
ence the loss of a loved one in that way. We do not, in general, start with 
knowledge of a range of possible experiences, and then, by exercising our 
imaginations, learn which of these experiences one would actually have in 
what circumstances. The more important job for our imaginations is that 
of expanding our repertoire of understood experiences. Imaginings help us 
to understand what it is like to feel a certain way, and only secondarily and 
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uncertainly, enable u co reali:e that chat is how we, or ochers. would 
actually feel in circumstances of a certain sorr. 
It is usually characters, people inside picture anJ novels, who have the 
interesting experience . Appreciators just watch. le i a character who 
must choose between love and duty. or who is shipwrecked alone on a 
desert island, or who suf ers bereavement. Appreciators, in the worlds of 
the games they play with the work, observe or read about or leam about 
the character's dilemma or his experiences on the desert island. In reading 
Yukio Mishima's "Death in Midsummer" I imagine learning about the 
tragic drownings of three children and about how their parents respond to 
it. Bur the experience of reading the story does not help me to understand 
merely what it is or might be like to learn abouc such tragedies befalling 
other people; it is likely to give me insight into what it is or might be like 
to suffer such a tragedy oneself, to lose one's own children. How does tihis 
happen? A quick answer is that I empathize wiith the parents in the story. 
This empathy involves imagining myself in their shoes, imagining suffering 
bereavement myself, and responding as they do. But I imagine this, I 
empathize with them, as a result of imagining learning about cheir tragedy 
and noting how they deal with it. 
' 
·� ..... �· &u.ow . .  
Figure 7: 
Van Gogh 
Sorrow { 1 882) 
Van Gogh's lithograph, Sorrow (figure 7) is, in obvious respects, much less 
explicit and detailed than Mishima's story. We have no way of knowing 
why the woman is sorrowful. And the picture is more suggestive th!ln 
explicit concerning her expressive behavior. We don't even see her face; 
all we have to go on is her hunched posture. Perhaps we "empathize" with 
her, imagining ourselves to be sorrowful in the way we take her (fiction­
ally} to be. But perhaps not. I am not sure that I actually imagine being 
sorrowful myself, when I contemplate the picture. I do imaginatively 
respond to the woman, however, in ways that are not easy to articulate. 
Understanding another person's feelings involves experiencing certain 
feelings oneself-feelings about the other person. By imagining feeling as I 
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do coward the woman, I 1maginacively under rand her. And chts imagina­
tive experience gains for me an understanding of what a particular kind of 
sorrow is lilc.e. 
All this began with the expansion of che piccure world into a world of 
make-believe big enough to include the perceiver as well as the concencs of 
che picture world. Rather than merely standing outside the picture and 
imagining what it depicts, imagining a sorrowful woman sitting hunched 
with her head and arms resting on her knees, I imagine myself seeing her 
and observing her sorrow. This leads to imagining feeling about her and for 
her, and perhaps with her, in ways that enable me imaginatively co 
understand her sorrow. Thus I come to understand what it is like to feel 
this way. 
None of this would be possible if pictures were merely imitations of 
visual forms, or if they were merely signs signifying or standing for things of 
the lcind they represent. None of chis would be possible if pictures were 
not, like hobby horses, props in games o( make-believe in which people 
participate visually, and also psychologically. 
Notes 
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Hempel Lectures at Princeton University in 1991. Parr of it 
appeared in An Issues 2 1  Oanuary/February 1992), pp. 22-.2 7. I 
develop the theory of make-bdieve sketched here more 
thoroughly in Mimesis as Make-Believe (Harvard University 
Press, 1990). 
1 For a more complete statement of my accounc of depiction, see 
Mimesis as Make Believe, Chapter 8. 
3 Ernst Gombrich, "Medications on a Hobby Horse," in Medi,ta­
tions on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays (London Phaidon 
Press, 1963), pp. 1-3.  
,. Nelson Goodman, Languages of An, second edition (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1976), p. 5. 
1 See David Summers, "Real Metaphor: Towards a Redefinition 
of the 'Conceptual' Image," in Norman Bryson et al., eds., 
Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1991), pp. 234-235. 
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i-: Actually, I am not in the world of Stanfield's picture; we now 
have a differem picture. But I am in a fictional world, the 
world of this new picture. 
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